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Subsidiary Brands as a Resource and the Redistribution 
of Decision Making Authority following Acquisitions 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the moves global brewery companies undertake towards the distribution 
of decision making authority in their multinational organization and the likelihood of newly 
acquired subsidiaries to influence these moves. In this consumer goods industry, brands are 
suggested to be the primary subsidiary specific resource to influence these distribution 
processes. Empirically this paper explores three European acquisitions of the Dutch brewery 
corporation Heineken in Switzerland, Slovakia, and France. We explore whether differing 
brand value (regional/international, standard/premium) has had an impact on the subsidiaries‟ 
ability to maintain a certain degree of decision making authority after the take-over. The 
results of our case studies show, however, that the ownership of valuable brands may not be 
considered as a critical resource for subsidiaries here. 
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Subsidiary Brands as a Resource and the Redistribution 
of Decision Making Authority following Acquisitions 
 
Introduction  
The world beer industry is in great flux. Stagnation of traditional beer markets in Western 
Europe and North America on the one hand and a strong and growing demand in the 
emerging markets of the Eastern Europe and China on the other hand puts among others an 
emphasis on the distribution of strategic decision-making authority in multinational 
breweries. The management of global brands speaks for centralization whereas the manifold 
local beer brands call for a decentralisation of decision-making authority regarding marketing 
and sales activities.   
 
Furthermore, mergers and acquisitions play a dominant role in the global beer industry.  
They lead to a quick access to markets and especially to the brands owned by the target 
firms. Simultaneously they enlarge the possibility of global brand utilization.  This paper 
questions whether acquired firms in the brewery sector keep their decision-making authority 
regarding their brand and marketing activities, or whether headquarters of the acquiring 
multinational corporation (MNC) centralizes such strategic decisions. In a wider sense, the 
paper investigates the relationship between subsidiary resources and the strategic 
developments of subsidiaries in the context of an MNC.  
 
Given the overall importance of the acquisition-integration dichotomy in the industry, this 
paper contributes with a high practical relevance to managers in the field (Oesterle and 
Laudin, 2007). Its practical relevance is driven by a research question that addresses the 
effective functioning of an MNC. Hereby we depart our investigation from a phenomenon, as 
suggested by Cheng (2007), rather than testing one „theory of the firm‟ in the context of the 
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brewery sector. Instead, we discuss the concept of decision-making authority in relation to 
decentralisation on the one hand, and acquisition-integration on the other. Investigating the 
distribution of decision making authority in the MNC, further, makes it possible to discuss 
relevance of global versus local leadership. 
  
In its empirical part the paper concentrates on Heineken of the Netherlands and three of its 
subsidiaries acquired in Switzerland, Slovakia, and France throughout the 1990ies. This 
sample enables a comparative angle on European management research, as proposed by 
Mayrhofer (2007). We, further, emphasize the European perspective by describing the 
foreign direct investment of a European company, focusing on acquisitions as entry mode.  
 
In the reminder the paper first provides a brief discussion of the literature dealing with the 
distribution of decision making authority in MNCs and put this concept into the perspectives 
of centralization and acquisition strategy.  Following some methodological annotations, the 
paper then turns to its empirical part. First, Heinekens overall integration strategy that aims at 
a strong centralization is studied. This is followed by a detailed investigation into the 
integration process of three recently acquired European subsidiaries of Heineken that vary 
considerably with regard to brand ownership. The paper closes with some assumptions as to 
what extent decision making authority in newly acquired subsidiaries remains decentralized 
and in how far brands form a basis for resisting headquarters‟ centralization attempts.  
   
Literature Review  
Subsidiary decision making authority is often associated with the concept of autonomy, and 
researchers like O‟Donnell (2000) define autonomy as the degree of decision making a 
subsidiary maintains. However, as Young and Tavares (2004) have shown, subsidiary 
autonomy can be conceptualized rather broadly as it might be associated with a.o.: subsidiary 
 6 
role, network position, entrepreneurship, procedural justice, and control. In order to keep our 
analysis focused, this paper only investigates whether acquired firms keep their right to make 
decisions regarding their brands and related marketing strategies following their take-over. 
Thus, decision making authority, defined by Goehe (1980:20) as the “…zone of discretion in 
making programmed or basic decisions as well as non-programmed or routine decisions”, is 
the concept being investigated.  
 
Traditionally, MNCs have been viewed as hierarchical entities where decision-making 
authority resided strongly within headquarters (Dunning, 1958). Later, Franko (1976) 
demonstrated that European MNCs to a higher degree decentralised decision-making than 
American MNCs. This empirical evidence paved the way for approaches in which decision 
making authority was considered to be more evenly distributed between headquarters and 
subsidiaries. For instance Hedlund (1986) argued that MNCs need to be seen as 
“heterarchies” which have more than one centre and in which individual subsidiaries might 
be given strategic decision-making authority not only for their own subsidiary but for the 
whole MNCs. However, other researchers like Kotthoff (2001) show a (re)centralization of 
strategic decision-making occurring in (German) MNCs.  
 
The fuzziness of the results should not come as a surprise, given fact that there are many 
simultaneously valid reasons for centralization and decentralisation of authority. Reasons in 
favour of a decentralization of decision making encompass the information overload at the 
top management in the headquarters, the need for local responsiveness at foreign operations, 
the desire to tap into local knowledge and the wish to motivate and reward subsidiaries 
(Baliga and Jaeger, 1984). Reasons that limit the decentralization of decision making 
authority comprise headquarters‟ desire to keep financial control, overall strategic authority 
and a final say in the shape of products, processes and corporate values. Furthermore, the 
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discussion of centralisation versus decentralisation has been associated to country-of-origin 
effects (Gates and Egelhoff, 1986), industry (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989), and function 
(McKern and Naman, 2003). Wirth regard to the latter, Vachani (1999) has demonstrated 
that subsidiary decision-making authority was greater for marketing than for R&D or 
finance. Finally, the issue of control is associated to this question (O‟Donnell, 2000), as 
decision-making rights might be decentralized, but in practice decisions are often made by 
expatriates that monitor and align activities to headquarters‟ preferences (Doz and Prahalad, 
1981). 
 
What is most likely to impact decision-making authority is, though, the control of resources 
upon which other MNC entities depend since they are critical to the overall performance of 
the company (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Based on the distinctiveness of its resources a 
subsidiary can gain different levels of power and independency from headquarters (Bouquet 
and Birkinshaw, 2008). Following Rugman and Verbeke (2001), such critical resources have 
some basic features: They incorporate knowledge that is tacit and fundamentally context 
specific, i.e. locally embedded and path dependent on the subsidiaries technological and 
organizational trajectory. Extant research has proven that specific technologies and product 
portfolios (Egelhoff et al., 1998) learning capabilities (Mu et al, 2007), entrepreneurial and 
managerial expertise (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1997) and internal R&D processes 
(Papanastassiou and Pearce, 2005) might turn out as critical resources that strongly empower 
subsidiaries vis-a-vis their headquarters.  
 
Remarkably little, however, is known about marketing resources and in particular about the 
role of brands as a critical resource. This is a major shortcoming of the literature since brands 
play a particular important role in consumer driven industries such as the beer industry. 
Brands are the key to the customers, and initial market access via established brands is a key 
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driver of the acquisition merry-go-around in the global brewery industry (Marinov and 
Marinova, 1999; Meyer and Tran, 2006; Meyer, 2007). The key question here is, in how far 
brands might turn out as critical resources that empower acquired subsidiaries vis-a-vis their 
new headquarters.  
 
The context of an acquisition adds another dimension, as the subsidiary brand value has been 
developed before the take-over. A literature review by Young and Tavares (2004) shows that 
acquired subsidiaries are likely to have greater decision-making authority because of these 
path-dependent historical conditions. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) here suggest different 
integration strategies, where the level of decision-making authority is emphasized. High level 
of decision-making authority is recommended in the situation of subsidiary specific resources 
that are likely to be destroyed if integrated too roughly, and e.g., key people are likely to 
leave the firm (Paruchuri et al, 2006). In other situations, the acquiring firm is recommended 
to absorb the target firm in order to reveal synergy and leave the new subsidiary with little 
decision-making authority. Though, recently, Schweizer (2005) has shown that different 
integration strategies can be associated to different value chain activities, by which the 
subsidiary might keep its decision-making authority in respect to marketing, and loose them 
in relation to, e.g., financial management. The question of whether acquired subsidiaries will  
keep their decision-making authority based on brand ownership must consequently 
dependent on whether brands are location-bound (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001), or brand-
related value will be destroyed if centralization is emphasized by the acquiring MNC 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). 
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Methodology  
Given the limited amount of knowledge on the role of brands as a critical resource 
subsidiaries might draw on, an exploratory case study approach was chosen to gather more 
data on the subject (Yin, 2003). Furthermore, this approach also supports the analysis of 
process phenomena (Pettigrew, 1990; Langley, 1999) such as the integration of subsidiaries 
over time. By adopting a process perspective, we are able to identify the conflict-ridden and 
non-linear phenomena of centralization and decentralization of decision-making authority 
which are made up by a series of events.  In order to avoid “death by data asphyxiation” 
(Pettigrew, 1990, p. 281) we followed a focused approach (George and Bennett 2005), i.e.  
integration issues and the role specific brands played were of interest only, even though we 
attempted to maintain the richness of data serving as background information. We chose a 
very specific empirical setting to isolate brand ownership effects on integration by studying 
three breweries Heineken acquired in Europe during the 1990ies that differ with regard to 
their brands‟ reach (regional, national or international brands) and quality (mainstream or 
premium/speciality brands). Given the fact that there is a trend towards premium/specialty 
brands in the market, these brands turn out to be more valuable then mainstream brands (see 
figure 1).  
 
***************** 
Figure 1 about here  
***************** 
 
Even though we are analysing only one company, our analysis of three subsidiary integration 
processes allows for thorough within case comparison. Data was collected from company 
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sources (of Heineken and the three acquired companies), encompassing annual reports, press 
releases, company newspapers and periodicals etc. In addition multiple secondary sources 
were used including the Zephyr database, national company handbooks as well as the Lexis-
Nexis database and the HWWA (Hamburg Institute of International Economics) press 
archive for an extensive news coverage. Some more specialised secondary sources such as 
company biographies and case studies (retrieved from the European Case Clearing house and 
Business Source Premier) were used too. 
   
The multiple sources accessed provided a dense and overlapping information base, which 
minimized typical problems tied to the use of secondary data such as, measurement error, 
source bias, low reliability and, probably most important, missing match with the needs of 
the study (Emory and Cooper, 1991). With regard to the latter, it turned out that national and 
regional newspapers showed a particular great interest as to what happened to „their‟ 
breweries and brands after being taken over. For these companies were often seen as part of a 
national or regional everyday culture.   
 
Data was gathered for an extended period starting in the years before the take over up until 
ten or more years after the acquisition, to cope with long term integration effects.  To 
enhance reliability of data analysis, author triangulation was applied (Houman-Anderson and 
Skaates, 2004). Even though interviews are often considered as a very important data source 
for case studies (Yin 2003, p. 89), we refrained from interviewing subsidiary managers as the 
period analysed (10 – 17 years) was very long and interviewees‟ responses might be prone to 
ex-post rationalization. Validity of the overall argument, however, was checked in an 
interview with a subsidiary manager of Heineken.  
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Heineken’s overall (De)centralization policy 
In the late 1980s Heineken was considered as a decentralized company (Lawrence, 1991), 
basically confirming extant theory, which assumes that a European company active in the 
food and beverage industry, should be rather decentralized (c.f. Franko 1976, Bartlett and 
Ghosal 1989). Heineken has, though, changed its strategy tremendously since the 1980ies. A 
recent study comes to the conclusion that over the last decades a strong “Heinekenisation” 
has taken place in foreign operations (Elshof, 2005, p. 12). This includes a strong 
centralization of decision-making authority with regard to marketing issues (ibid.). Despite 
the fact that Heineken owns a large portfolio of 170 regional, national and speciality brands, 
the globally distributed brands „Heineken‟ and „Amstel‟ are still the most important revenue 
base for Heineken. They alone account for about 30 per cent of beer produced (in terms of 
volume) and they are highly profitable (Heineken, 2007). Thus “keeping the Heineken brand 
healthy and growing” is seen as vital (Heineken, 2007, p. 10). On this behalf, all marketing 
policy (including guidelines and standards for brand style, brand value and brand 
development) for the two global brands („Heineken‟ and „Amstel‟) is made at the 
headquarters. Headquarters, further, strongly controls and supports the local marketing of 
these brands (Elshof, 2005). In addition, a particular emphasis is put on so-called “top-line 
growth” (Heineken, 2007 p. 7), i.e. the marketing of higher priced premium and speciality 
beers with a high profit margin in expense of lower profitable beer types (standard, low-
price, trademarks). Therefore, Heineken motivates foreign subsidiaries to put strong 
emphasis on selling the global brands of Heineken.  
 
Conformity to headquarters standards is secured by a huge army of expatriates. In 2002, a 
total of 260 expatriates mainly of Dutch nationality were employed in 62 countries 
(Heineken, 2002), with these managers switching their positions almost every five years 
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(Fiedler, 2004). Therefore, decision-making authority at Heineken seemingly is highly 
centralized. The implementation of headquarters decisions in foreign subsidiaries are tightly 
monitored by direct personal control through expatriates. The question, however, remains to 
what extent overall centralization policy of Heineken is feasible in newly acquired 
subsidiaries that might own critical marketing resources. This will be looked at in more detail 
below studying the integration process of three recently acquired subsidiaries that differ in 
ownership of more or less valuable brands. 
 
 
Three case studies 
 An overlooked aspect in the literature so far is subsidiary brands and its relationship to 
subsidiary decision-making authority. The basic question to be looked at throughout the 
cases is therefore, what effects do different kinds of brands (global-, local-, or specialty 
brands) have on the ability of subsidiaries to maintain decision-making authority after being 
acquired?  
 
Heineken deliberately prefers to acquire small or medium sized companies (see table 1). 
Consequently, target firms only slightly differ with regard to size, volume and sales of the 
acquired companies. The three cases analysed below represent such rather small acquisitions. 
There is little difference among those three companies with regard to size, volume and sales, 
but there are differences with regard to their brand portfolio.  
 
******************** 
Table 1 about here 
******************* 
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The selected cases were:   
- Calanda-Haldengut, a Swiss brewery company, acquired in 1993. This company operated 
two brands („Calanda‟ and „Haldengut‟) that are regional in scope and standard in 
quality. 
- Zlatý Bažant of Slovakia, acquired in 1996. This company maintained a national 
premium brand („Zlatý Bažant‟) that even was exported to neighbouring countries.  
- Brasserie Fischer of France, also acquired in 1996. This company operated a specialty 
beer brand named „Desperados‟ which gained strong popularity in many European 
countries in the acquisition year.  
These three companies strongly represent the different types of companies Heineken has 
taken over in last decades (altogether Heineken has taken over 37 brewery companies in 
Europe from 1990-2008 (see table 1).  They are also quite representative for the different 
kinds of brewery companies at sale on the European market.  Table 2 gives an overview on 
some characteristics of the three newly acquired subsidiaries studied.   
 
***************** 
Table 2 about here 
***************** 
 
Case 1: Calanda Haldengut, Switzerland - regional/standard brands as a critical resource?  
Heineken‟s take-over of Calanda Haldengut, a holding of two regional breweries in 
Switzerland, in 1993, was the first large foreign incursion into the Swiss beer market. 
Heineken had already acquired ten percent in the holding a few years before, presumably in 
order to achieve some control over its Swiss distributor of the Heineken brand.  Calanda 
Haldengut was an important player on the Swiss beer market. It held a 12.5 per cent market 
share (600,000 hl in 1992) in the beer market of which 420,000 hl were own brands. 
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Additionally, it distributed and produced 600,000 hl soft drinks (e.g. by a licence production 
of Coca Cola).  
 
The two brands „Calanda‟ and „Haldengut‟ appeared to be problematic being regional in 
scope and standard in quality. Second, the company struggled with a sluggish Swiss beer 
market. Furthermore, the Haldengut Holding, one of the holding partners and majority 
stakeholder in Calanda Haldengut, did not voluntarily search for an international partner, but 
was forced to do so, due to permanent liquidity problems. Therefore, some voices 
immediately urged that Heineken would be less interested in the development of the regional 
brands, but rather in the distribution network to channel Heineken beer to the Swiss market 
(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, December 24, 1993). 
 
Subsequent to the take-over, Heineken management took control. First, Heineken Veteran 
Willem Hosang led the corporation followed in 2002 by Boudewijn van Rompu, former CEO 
of  Heineken Vietnam. Then the typical Heineken acquisition-integration strategy was 
implemented including the sale of real estate property and unrelated businesses like soft 
drink production. Consolidation also affected the configuration of breweries. A focused 
investment policy towards the Calanda site in Chur led to the closure of the incumbent 
Haldengut brewery in Wintherthur in the realm of a Heineken-wide cost cutting program. 
Two years before, Heineken had acquired the rest of the outstanding shares and renamed the 
company to Heineken Switzerland AG.  
 
The strategic alignment of the subsidiary‟s brand portfolio turned out to be a headquarters 
matter. It was Heineken‟s CEO, Karel Vursteen, who announced that Calanda and Haldengut 
would become national flagship brands and that this would be accompanied by an aggressive 
marketing campaign and improved service in gastronomy. Vursteen utterances, however, 
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turned out to be rather non-binding for the decade to come. On the contrary, the subsidiary‟s 
brand portfolio suffered in that period of time from competition by genuine Heineken brands. 
In the following years, Heineken introduced an international premium brand („Heineken‟), an 
international standard brand („Amstel‟) and a variety of specialty brands. „Amstel‟ was 
introduced accompanied by a massive marketing effort and had been brewed in Chur from 
1996. From a Calanda Haldengut point of view this move was conflicting, as „Amstel‟ 
belonged to the same segment as the „Calanda‟ and „Haldengut‟ brands. As several annual 
reports indicate, „Heineken‟ and „Amstel‟ gained market share significantly in absolute and 
relative terms, whereas „Calanda‟ and „Haldengut‟ lost. Without additional support, 
„Calanda‟ and „Haldengut‟ sales decreased with the overall demand for standard beer. The 
growth of „Heineken‟ justified its local production from 1998 onwards. From 1997, further 
specialty brands such as „Ittinger Klosterbräu‟, „Erdinger Weissbier‟ and alcohol-free 
„Buckler‟ were imported.  
 
The promise to launch either „Calanda‟ or „Haldengut‟ nationwide was only fulfilled in 2005, 
twelve years after the acquisition, but with meagre success only. Today, „Calanda‟ and 
„Haldengut‟ only account for about 2.7 per cent of the Swiss beer market each, whereas 
„Heineken‟ has 9 per cent.  
 
Summing up, the ownership of regional and standard beers did not impede the loss of 
subsidiary decision-making authority. Heineken supervises its Swiss business through 
expatriates and has merged various Swiss companies. The massive introduction of global 
brands such as „Heineken‟ and „Amstel‟, whose marketing strategy is defined at the 
headquarters, at the expense of regional brands, shows that the subsidiary lost decision 
making authority not only in deciding on important strategy-related areas, but also on matters 
related to the compilation of the subsidiary‟s brand portfolio.   
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Case 2:  Heineken’s Slovakian breweries - premium brands as a critical resource?   
The acquisition of a 66 per cent stake at the Slovakian corporation Zlatý Bažant was similar 
to the case of Calanda Haldengut with regard to the following features: Heineken was the 
first international player that invested into the country;  Zláty Bazănt, like Calanda 
Haldengut, accounted for about 10 per cent of the market; and the output volume of Zlatý 
Bažant was only slightly higher than at Calanda Haldengut (450,000 hl) in the acquisition 
year. Furthermore, both companies had to struggle with problems: Whereas Haldengut 
suffered from a liquidation crisis, Zlatý Bažant lost a 9 per cent market share between 1994 
and 1995 due to a re-organization measure. 
 
Beside these similarities, there were also some differences: First, Calanda Haldengut was 
located in a developed country with a mature market, whereas Zlatý Bažant was located in a 
transition economy with a growing market for beer (at least until 2003). Second, Zláty 
Bazănt owned a national premium brand („Zlatý Bažant‟), which had even been exported 
(e.g. to the Czech Republic). Additionally, Zlatý Bažant ran its own malt house beside the 
brewery. 
 
As in the Swiss case, a manager with a strong Heineken background (Marc Bolland) became 
general director of Zlatý Bažant just after the take-over. Other Heineken managers followed 
(Jean Paul van Hollebeke and Dimitar Aleksiev). Financial management of the subsidiary has 
remained in Dutch hands until today.  
Next to modernizing Zlatý Bažant and upgrading one of its brands, Heineken bought three 
other breweries (Corgon, Martin, Gemer) in Slovakia between 1997 and 2000. In 1999, 
marketing activities of Corgon and Zlatý Bažant were combined into a new company, called 
Heineken Slovensko. Martin and Gemer were also integrated into that company following 
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their acquisition. When beer consumption went down due to an increase of alcohol taxes in 
2003, the breweries at Corgon, Martin, Gemer were closed down and production was 
transferred to Hurbanovo, which remained the single Heineken production site in Slovakia. 
Until 2001, Heineken Slovensko delivered no profits, due to the large investments into the 
brewing and malting facilities. Today, Heineken Slovensko produces about 2 ml hl of beer 
per year and has a 37 per cent market share. Since 2003, the subsidiary is directly controlled 
by Austrian Brau Union, Heineken‟s regional Central and Eastern European headquarters.  
 
Even though the introduction of global brands has been negligible compared to the Swiss 
case, the strategic alignment of Zláty Bazănt‟s endogenous brands was in this case also a 
headquarters‟ matter. In 1999, the subsidiary was forced by the headquarters to give up its 
successful license production of Gambrinus, a traditional Czech Pilsner. Today, Zláty 
Bazănt‟, now renamed Heineken Slovensko, sells similar brands from other Heineken Czech 
subsidiaries such as „Krušovice‟ or „Starobrno‟. Further, „Desperados‟ fills the gap left by a 
lack of indigenous  Zláty Bazănt‟ specialty brands. 
 
Second, the headquarters took control over the repositioning of „Zláty Bazănt‟. It was 
introduced in other Central European countries, even though it was not well known until 
then. Following Marc Bolland, general director of Zlatý Bažant at that time: “an „exotic 
brand from somewhere‟ [is] a good place to start” (Bolland cit. in Boland 1996). Thereby, 
headquarters decided on a re-launch of the familiar logo of „Zláty Bazănt‟ (the pheasant, king 
of farmland birds) in order to make it more prominent and a little less mechanic. It is fair to 
say, therefore, that „Zláty Bazănt‟ has become the „Heineken‟ for Slovakia and neighbouring 
countries. Even though consumers may buy „Heineken‟ and „Amstel‟ in Slovakia, these 
brands do not belong to the top 20 beer brands in Slovakia. The Zlatý Bažant brands, 
however, account for 10.4 per cent of the Slovakian market. They are exported to USA, 
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Canada, the Ukraine, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldavia, or Kazakhstan (Export) 
and produced under license in Poland, Czech Republic and Russia (Heineken Slovensko 
Homepage). Coincidently, cans of „Zláty Bazănt‟ were upgraded in 2004 in regards of design 
and are now shining in new elegant green, the colour of Heineken.   
 
The restructuring and integration process at the various Slovakian brewers acquired by 
Heineken was as fierce as in the Swiss case. Heineken personnel filled in CEO and Financial 
management positions, quickly closed down production sites and transferred brands to one 
single site. The Hurbanova site („Zláty Bazănt‟) was spared from being closed down and has 
been even extended through new brewing and malting facilities.  
In marketing affairs, Heineken headquarters took control over the strategic realignment of 
„Zláty Bazănt‟. „Zlatý Bažant‟ was successfully integrated into Heineken‟s Central and 
Eastern European brand portfolio and plays a „Heineken‟-like role there, albeit at a regional 
level. However, the subsidiary itself had only little impact on these strategic decisions, they 
were assigned by the headquarters.   
 
 
Case 3: Brasserie Fischer, France - Specialty brands as a critical resource?  
Heineken was well established in France holding about 23 per cent market share and 
employing 3,700 people, when it acquired Brasserie Fischer and its subsidiary Societé 
Adelshoffen in 1996.  At that time, Heineken, further, owned a brewery located in 
Schiltigheim, Brasserie Fischer‟s home base. The take-over was 1.3 billion FF worth and 
added 950 employees to the Heineken payroll in France. Together with a further acquisition 
in Northern France, Heineken‟s share in the French beer market rose to 30 per cent, securing 
its number two position behind market leader Danone (43 per cent). 
 
 19 
Brasserie Fischer was a pro-active company. For instance, Brasserie Fischer had developed a 
range of speciality beers of which „Desperados‟ - an aromatized Tex-Mex beer introduced in 
1995 - gained strong popularity in the acquisition year. This was exactly what lacked 
Heineken for quite some time: successful speciality brands that give access to young beer 
drinkers.  
 
At first sight, the typical Heineken consolidation strategy was applied. Thus the brewery at 
Brasserie Fischer‟s subsidiary Adelshoffen was closed and its brands (e.g. „Adelsscott`) were 
transferred to the production site of Brasserie Fischer in Schiltigheim in 2000, which had 
already been upgraded in 1998.  Moreover, the majority of the 250 distributors that were 
bound to Brasserie Fischer, were taken over in the wake of the acquisition and used to 
channel more Heineken Brands to the French customers (Kahlen, 2002).  
 
Brasserie Fischers‟ breweries, though, have never produced „Heineken‟, for this brand has 
been produced in other French sites of the corporation. Moreover, Brasserie Fischer has 
maintained relatively long its decision making authority, as Heineken allowed this subsidiary 
a “spécialiste des spécialites” status (La Tribune, November 13, 2001, p. 24). Thus Heineken 
for some time acknowledged Fischer‟s innovativeness and refrained from integrating the 
company into its regional holding in France, Sogebra.  Fischer maintained its own R&D 
centre and was planning two product innovations per year.  
 
By doing so Heineken France developed Brasserie Fischer into a centre for beer mix drinks. 
The production of „Desperados‟ that was now sold by the whole Heineken distribution 
network grew in importance in the Schiltigheim site at the expense of other beers (basically 
beers that belong to the Brasserie Fischer product portfolio). While this at first allowed for 
economies of scale it later-on created massive problems, when the beer mix drinks faced an 
 20 
increasing competition by numerous types of Alco-pops (Agence France Press, April 7, 
2005). This led to a downturn in sales (50 per cent in the years 2003 and 2004) and to re-
organizations, redundancies and finally to the integration of Brasserie Fischer into Sogebra 
and its loss of its own R&D centre in 2005. This move went hand in hand with the creation 
of a marketing unit for speciality brands in the regional headquarters. Recently (in 2008), the 
Production site of Brasserie Fischer was closed down and the personnel partly transferred to 
Heineken‟s second subsidiary in Schiltigheim and its other French sites. 
 
Summing up this case: With a time lag, Brasserie Fischer was, like in the two other cases, 
fully absorbed into Heineken‟s company network. Heineken‟s acknowledgment of Brasserie 
Fischer‟s innovativeness made the latter temporarily an exception to the rule, but dependency 
on one type of beverages, made the company vulnerable and prone to Heineken overall 
integration strategy.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
Table 2 gives a summary of the three cases studied. In all cases, we can see a high degree of 
integration and centralization of decision-making authority following acquisition. In two out 
of three cases, personal control was established right after the acquisition and has been 
maintained until today. In the third case (Brasserie Fischer), decision making authority at the 
beginning was surprisingly high, but later-on, all production sites were closed down and the 
brands were integrated into Heineken‟s regional division in France. In regard to marketing 
decisions, it is clear that the strategic decision of the brand portfolio, i.e. the question which 
brands are supposed to be maintained or introduced or which brands are worth being boosted 
by the company-wide distribution network is a headquarters matter. In the Calanda-
Haldengut case, it was clear that the introduction of the global brands, „Heineken‟ and 
„Amstel‟, was a top priority in expense of the regional standard brands. In the Slovakian 
 21 
case, Heineken decided over the brand portfolio in Slovakia, but also supported „Zlatý 
Bažant‟ to become the „Heineken‟ of Slovakia and its neighbouring countries. Brasserie 
Fischer had some decision-making authority in developing new beer mix beverages for the 
whole company network. However, decentralization happened rather as a consequence of 
acknowledging the subsidiary‟s innovativeness rather than owning a specific valuable brand. 
Dependency on beer mix beverages only revealed to be fatal for Fischer. Even though the 
faith of the brands had been very different in our three cases, the centralization of decision 
making at Heineken headquarters was largely the same in the long run.   
 
***************** 
Table 3 about here 
****************** 
 
Taken together, the case studies demonstrate that brand ownership can hardly be seen as a 
critical resource, that empower newly acquired subsidiaries in the brewery industry. In all 
three cases studied, Heineken‟s strong overall centralization policy overruled subsidiary 
attempts to maintain autonomy. This extended to subsidiary management, which was 
replaced by Heineken personnel, to operations, that were streamlined by rationalization 
measures and plant closures, and in particular to brand ownership and brand-specific decision 
making competencies. With regard to the latter subsidiaries in the long run lost all strategic 
competencies (e.g the right to decide on the development of new and incumbent brands as 
well as the right to decide on the range and priority of brands distributed) with only a few 
operational competencies remaining at subsidiary level.  
 
Interestingly the value of the brand did not make a difference here. More valuable brands 
such as „Zláty Bazănt‟ that turned out to be international in reach, and premium in quality did 
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not allow for a greater subsidiary decision-making authority than ,e.g., the regional/standard 
brand „Calanda‟. A somewhat deviant case here is the case of Brasserie Fischer, where 
headquarters centralization policy only occurred with a certain time lag. According to our 
impression however, it was not the availability of a successful speciality brand that initially 
blocked a centralization of decision making authority but - as mentioned above- the 
innovation capability of the subsidiary that is less portable and needs a higher level of 
absorptive capacity to be developed over time by the headquarters.  
 
Looking into the reasons, why the brands studied here hardly turn out to serve as critical 
resources for newly acquired subsidiaries, the following points seem instructive. First, as 
many contributions from the global marketing literature have set out, the consumption of 
beer, as a culturally sensitive product, is highly subject to country-of-origin effects (Schaefer, 
1997; Phau and Suntornnond, 2006; Dawes, 2008). In other words the national origin of a 
product implies a strong preference of customers. Sometimes even the city-of-origin is 
playing an important role (Lentz et al., 2007). However taking into consideration the results 
from our case studies, national or local origin is clearly not associated with subsidiary 
ownership and only loosely associated with the spatial dimension of where the branded 
product is produced. Concentration of production, at least at national level, seems not to 
harm customers brand loyalty.  
 
Second, while more traditional consumers stick to incumbent national brands - or at least to 
brands that successfully carry this image - especially younger consumers feel more inclined 
to accept global brands such as „Heineken‟ or „Amstel‟ next  to or as a substitute for national 
or regional brands. This trend of cross border sub-cultural consumer behaviour (Welge and 
Holtbrügge, 1999) is generally weakening the role of national and regional brands as a power 
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resource for subsidiaries since it genuinely supports and justifies the introduction of 
headquarters‟ global brands. 
 
Third, the case studies also demonstrate that Heineken is following a very careful policy in 
changing and re-launching incumbent brand images. Moreover, ultimate ownership 
information is not indicated at all on the products or in a rather hidden way to avoid brand 
corrosion.      
 
Fourth, in line with overall findings on the transfer of marketing knowledge (Schlegelmilch 
and Chini, 2003) brand related knowledge seem to be rather easy to transfer from the 
subsidiary to the headquarters. In terms of Rugman and Verbeke (2001) the brand and the 
brand image itself seem to codify the many tacit and fundamentally context specific 
knowledge associated with selling a particular type of beer. Other knowledge associated with 
marketing beer - e.g. specific advertising, event marketing - is not specialized to the 
subsidiary, rather nationally (if at all).        
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Figure 1 – Different types of brands and their “value” 
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Table 1 – Heineken’s acquistions in Europe 1990-2008 (June)  
 
Company Country Year First stake in 
per cent 
Sales volume (in 
mil hl) in year 
before acquisition 
Komaromi Sorgyar RT Hungary 1991 50.3 0,35 
Le Cave de Chalet France 1993 83.0 n.a.  
Calanda-Haldengut Switzerland 1993 52.3 1.20 
Zagorka-Brauerei Bulgaria 1994 80.0 0,97 
Grupa Zywiec Poland 1994 24.9 2,0 
Interbrew Italia Italy 1995 100.0 n.a. 
Zlatý Bazant Slovakia 1995 66.0 0.45 
Brasserie Fischer France 1996 54.4 1.70 
Saint Arnould France 1996 66.0 1.40 
Birra Moretti SpA Italy 1996 100.0 1.50 
Ariana Bulgaria 1997 64.5 n.a. 
Karsay Slovakia 1998 49.0 0.50 
Affligem Brouwerij 
BDS NV 
Belgium 2000 50.0 0.07 
Gemer Slovakia 2000 52.8 0.25 
Martiner Slovakia 2000 51.0 0.32 
Cruzcampo SA Spain 2000 88.2 6.00 
Brau Holding 
International AG 
Germany 2001 49.9 10.50 
Karlsberg International 
Brand GmbH 
Germany 2002 40.0 4.90 
Bravo International Russia 2002 100.0 2.90 
Hoepfner Germany 2004 100.0 0.20 
Fürstlich 
Fürstenbergische 
Brauerei KG 
Germany 2004 100.0 0.70 
BBAG /Brau Union Austria 2004 MAJ 16.00 
SOBOL Beer LLC Russia 2004 100.0 0.20 
Central European 
Brewing Group 
(CEBCO) 
Russia 2004 100.0 1.80 
VINAP Russia 2004 100.0 n.a. 
Würzburger Hofbräu Germany 2005 90.7 0.36 
Baikal Brewery JSC Russia 2005 100.0 0.58 
Patra Brewery Russia 2005 100.0 0.77 
Pivovarni Ivana 
Taranova 
Russia 2005 100.0 0.29 
Stepan Razin Russia 2006 100.0 1.40 
Krušovice 
Czech 
Republic 
2007 100.0 0.70 
Rodic Serbia 2007 n.a. 0.50 
Scottish & Newcastle 
(various country 
businesses) 
UK 2008 100.0 29.7 (excl. BBH) 
Bere Mures Romania 2008 n.a. 1.20 
Drinks Union 
Czech 
Republic 
2008 100.0 1.90 
Rechitsa Belarus 2008 n.a. 0.29 
Eichhof Switzerland 2008 96.5 n.a. 
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Table 2: Characteristics of case study companies in the year before acquisition 
 SIZE 
BRANDS 
 
Volume in mil. 
hl 
Sales in mil. 
$US 
Number of 
employees 
Calanda 
Haldengut 
1.20 (of which 
0.6 are beer) 
165.8 n.a. 
Regional 
mainstream 
brands: 
Calanda and 
Haldengut 
Zláty Bazănt 0.45 20.6 600 
National/intern. 
premium brand: 
Zláty Bazănt 
Brasserie 
Fischer 
1.70 222.7 950 
International 
specialty brand: 
Desperados  
 
Table 3: Integration processes and decision-making authority  
Company Overall 
Integration and 
Streamlining 
Centralization of 
strategic marketing 
decision 
 
How Heineken has 
proceeded with the brand… 
Calanda- 
Haldengut 
High High 
 
Negligence 
Zláty Bazănt High High 
 
Boost 
Brasserie 
Fischer  
First: Low 
Today: High 
First: low 
Today: High 
De and re-centralization of 
responsibilities 
 
 
 
 
